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Cost Containment in the Health Care
Industry: An Analysis of Physician
Reimbursement Under Medicare and
the Implication for Future Regulation
in the Health Care Field
I. Introduction
The United States is faced with a "cost crisis" in the health care
industry. ' Recent statistics show that funds expended on health care
now contribute eight and one-half percent of the gross national
product (GNP).2 In the past twenty years the portion of the GNP
allocated to medical costs has doubled3 and there are predictions
that the contribution will rise to ten percent by 1980.'
Primary responsibility for the regulation of the cost of health
care has traditionally rested with the medical profession and the pri-
vate health insurance industry. Since the inception of the Medicare
Program, 5 however, Congress has assumed an active role in the
struggle to curb the cost of medical care. With National Health In-
surance (NHI)6 on the horizon,7 Congress will have to assume a
more aggressive role in assuring that quality health care is made
available at reasonable costs. Therefore, before adopting a NHI pro-
posal, members of Congress should carefully consider the problems
I. See GNP, PERSPECTIVE (Summer 1978).
2. Id at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. The Medicare Program was established by the Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
97, §§ 101-122, 79 Stat. 286 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1976)). The Program
is divided into two parts-Part A, Hospital Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled, and
Part B, Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled. The dichotomy
is similar to the Blue Cross-Blue Shield arrangement wherein Blue Cross provides coverage for
hospital benefits and facility related costs, and Blue Shield covers medical expenses that inure
directly to the patient, e.g., physician's charges. Efforts at cost containment have been at-
tempted under both Part A and Part B of the Program. This comment is limited to a discus-
sion of cost containment efforts under Part B.
6. National Health Insurance is defined as a comprehensive national plan for the provi-
sion of and payment for health care. The primary goals include insuring that all persons have
access to medical care, eliminating the financial hardship of medical bills, and limiting the rise
in health care costs. See K. DAVIS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND
CONSEQUENCES (1975).
7. President Carter hopes for the passage of a national health insurance plan by 1980.
See NHL 5 Options, PERSPECTIVE (SUMMER 1978).
they will encounter in the effort to regulate physicians' charges. The
experience gained from the administration of Medicare can provide
valuable information regarding the best methods of controlling infla-
tionary charging practices of physicians.
The courts have never seriously disputed that cost containment
is a valid objective of the Medicare program.8 The theory behind
these decisions is that cost containment in the health field is a major
governmental concern9 and that a "legitimate government goal is
minimizing the cost of services provided under the Medicare act."' 0
Since the courts have been receptive to congressional regulation
of physicians' charges, Medicare has provided a practical environ-
ment for experimentation in cost containment. Through a twelve
year evolutionary process, Medicare has developed the following
three primary methods of reimbursing physicians' charges: reason-
able charge,'' relative value guides,' 2 and lowest charge level.' 3 An
analysis of the development and deficiencies of these payment meth-
8. See Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1974) (court agreed
with the Secretary that Congress, in enacting the Medicare legislation, sought to encourage the
efficient and economical use of medical facilities).
9. See notes 158-163 and accompanying text infra.
10. Chelsea Community Hosp., Skilled Nursing Facility v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n,
436 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
11. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) defines reasonable
charge as follows:
The Medicare carrier for your area determines the reasonable charges for cov-
ered services and supplies in your area. Each year, the carrier reviews the actual
charges made by doctors and suppliers in your area during the previous year. Based
on this review, new reasonable charges are put into effect about July I of each year.
Here's how reasonable charges are determined.
First, the carrier determines the customary charge (generally the charge most
frequently made) by each doctor and supplier for each separate service or supply
furnished to patients in the previous calendar year.
Next, the carrier determines the prevailing charge for each covered service and
supply. The prevailing charge is the amount which is high enough to cover the cus-
tomary charges in three out of every four bills submitted in the previous year for each
service and supply. However, increases in prevailing charges for doctors' services are
limited from year to year by an 'economic index' formula which relates doctors' fee
increases to the actual increases in the cost of maintaining their practices and to raises
in general earnings levels. This formula does not limit the amount a doctor may
charge a patient. It only limits the amount Medicare can pay.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, YOUR MEDICARE HANDBOOK, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 26 (1977) (emphasis added).
12. "Relative value scales attempt in a general way to show by a unit or point designa-
tion, the relationship between the time, competence, experience, and other factors required to
perform one professional service as compared with those required for other professional serv-
ices, under usual conditions." ROBERT H. IvY SOCIETY, ROBERT H. IVY SOCIETY RELATIVE
VALUE SCALE FOR PLASTIC SURGERY (3d rev. ed. 1971). A relative value guide lists numerical
values for all procedures performed by a medical specialty. The values are referred to as units.
The units are multiplied by a dollar value to determine the amount a physician will charge for
his service. The dollar value is called a conversionfactor. For example, a plastic surgeon re-
pairs a scar 6 centimeters in length. The scale assigns 50 units to the procedure. Assuming the
physician has a $6.00 conversion factor, his charge for the service is $300.00.
13. The lowest charge level concept of payment uses the reasonable charge system, see
note I I supra, to determine its basic allowable charge. The basic figure is then compared to a
maximum dollar amount established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The
lower amount is deemed to be the allowable charge. For a detailed discussion of the lowest
charge level determination see notes 126-146 and accompanying text infra.
ods will enable Congress to benefit from the Medicare experiment' 4
and adopt the most effective method of cost containment available
for inclusion in a NHI proposal.
Each of the payment concepts utilized under Medicare presents
unique administrative and legal problems that must be examined in
an attempt to determine the superior method. This comment reviews
the inherent weaknesses and strengths of the reasonable charge, rela-
tive value guide, and "lowest charge level" systems of payment. Em-
phasis is placed upon the legal and administrative problems of each
concept since a theoretically effective method of cost control is value-
less if it is administratively unmanageable or legally unacceptable.
II. Evolution of Medicare Cost Containment Provisions
A. Reasonable Charge
The original Medicare Act' 5 provides for the payment of physi-
cians' services on a reasonable charge basis.' 6 Responsibility for the
creation of regulations for the development and implementation of
the reasonable charge system was delegated to the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.' 7
The reasonable charge concept as initially implemented proved
to be an inadequate means of cost control because physicians were
permitted to raise their charges at will. ' 8 Through a series of regula-
tions,'9 Congress attempted to control physicians' charges while re-
taining the basic reasonable charge format. An examination of the
congressional effort to save the reasonable charge system will reveal
that this concept of payment is inappropriate as a method of contain-
ing physicians' charges.
1. Historical Analysis.
a. Initial implementation.-The initial Medicare regulations
provided that a reasonable charge with regard to Medicare was the
lowest of a physician's actual charge on a claim, his customary
14. The knowledge gained from Medicare is especially important since many of the NHI
proposals utilize some aspect of the present Medicare Program. Some proposals retain a fed-
eral health insurance program for the aged and poor, and others retain the Medicare concept
of, at least in part, having the national program administered by private health insurance carri-
ers. Even Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and labor representatives are now be-
coming willing to accept a national health plan that gives private insurers a substantial
administrative role in exchange for early passage of national health insurance. NI: 5 Op-
tions, supra note 7, at 7-18.
15. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 101-122, 79 Stat. 286 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1976)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(A) (1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (1976). References made hereinafter to the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare will be to the Secretary.
18. See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 27-42 and accompanying text infra.
charge of record for the service, or the top prevailing charge in the
locality for a similar service.2" A charge could not be deemed rea-
sonable if it was higher than the amount that the carrier 2 1 would
allow for the same service under its own comparable programs.
22
From 1966 through March of 1969, carriers were authorized to
establish a physician's customary charge on the basis of survey
data.23 Under this method physicians advised the carrier of the
amounts that they considered to be their standard charge for a serv-
ice.24 After the customary charge data was submitted, the prevailing
charge for the service was established at the 75th percentile 25 of the
customary charges submitted by physicians in an established local-
ity.26
20. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.501-.507 (1978).
21. "Medicare payments are handled by private insurance organizations under contract
with the Government. Organizations handling claims from hospitals, skilled nursing facilities,
and home health agencies are called intermediaries. Organizations handling claims from doc-
tors and other suppliers of services covered under the medicical insurance part of Medicare are
called carriers." SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, YOUR MEDICARE HANDBOOK 5 (1977).
22. 42 C.F.R. § 405.508 (1978). Many ofthe Medicare carriers are also in the business of
selling private health insurance and many offer prevailing fee programs, ie., programs under
which payment is based upon the same reasonable charge concepts utilized by Medicare.
Therefore, in an effort to assure that charges deemed reasonable under Medicare did not ex-
ceed allowances being made to the private policyholders, it was stipulated that a charge deter-
mined to be reasonable under Medicare could never exceed the charge established under the
carrier's own prevailing fee programs for the same service. For example, a physician's actual
charge for a service is $25.00. This amount is within both his customary charge of record for
the service and the prevailing charge. If, under the prevailing charge screens, see note I I
supra, utilized by the carrier in its own programs, the physician can only receive $20.00; for
Medicare purposes $20.00 is the reasonable charge.
23. The Medicare carrier's survey obtained information directly from health care provid-
ers and medical society surveys. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PART B INTERMEDIARY MANUAL § 6704 (July 1966).
24. In Pennsylvania, a physician could increase his "customary" charge simply by advis-
ing the carrier of a new charge. On April 13, 1966, Pennsylvania Blue Shield, the carrier for
the Medicare program in Pennsylvania, forwarded a questionnaire to all physicians practicing
in the Commonwealth. The information was used to establish a fee schedule less rigid than
the fixed fee program then in use and to provide a payment method that would keep pace with
physicians' charges.
25. 42 C.F.R. § 405.504 (1978). Payment at the 75th percentile means that physicians'
customary charges submitted for a service are listed in order of amount, beginning with the
lowest. The prevailing charge is then set at the dollar amount that covers at least 75% of the
charges. See note II supra.
26. A locality is determined on the basis of the "political and economic subdivision of the
State, and it should include a cross-section of the population with respect to economic and
other characteristics." SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE, MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL § 5020.1 (Dec. 1975). Further, carriers
were advised to
delineate localities on the basis of their knowledge of local conditions. The localities
may differ in population density, economic level, and other major factors affecting
charges for services. However, distinctions between localities should not be so finely
made that a locality includes only a very limited geographic area whose nopulation
has distinctly similar income characteristics (e.g., a very rich or very poo neighbor-
hood within a city).
Id For the purpose of Medicare reimbursement in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth was
initially divided into four areas: (1) areas surrounding university teaching hospitals; (2) major
metropolitan areas; (3) lesser metropolitan areas; and (4) rural areas. With some minor altera-
tions in the original boundaries, these divisions have remained unaltered.
Dissatisfied with a method of establishing reasonable charges
that permitted uncontrolled price elevations, the Secretary, in Febru-
ary of 1969, ordered a "freeze" on all customary charge changes. 27
At that time, carriers were instructed to begin accumulating data
from claims submitted by physicians or their patients on or after
January 1, 1969. When a sufficient amount of information had been
gathered, customary charges were to be established based upon ac-
tual claim charging experience.28 The prevailing charges would then
be set at the 75th percentile of the thus established customary
charges. 29 Additional regulation provided that no prevailing charge
could, as a result of the application of the new method of establish-
ing reasonable charges, be set at a lower rate than the prevailing
charge for that service when the freeze was implemented in 1969.30
The first charge screens'' based upon actual data became effective on
January 1, 197 1.32 The screens were based upon physicians' charges
for services rendered during 1969."3
This method of establishing reasonable charges remained virtu-
ally unaltered34 until July 1, 1975. At that time, new efforts at cost
control were statutorily3" implemented through the use of an eco-
nomic index in establishing prevailing charges. The purpose of the
change was to set limits on increases in prevailing charges.36
27. When this directive was issued the nationwide premium for Part B coverage was
$4.00. The freeze was imposed to eliminate the need for an increase in the premium rate.
Memorandum from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (Feb. 25, 1969).
28. Id
29. See note 25 supra.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(E) (1976).
31. Charge screens is the terminology used to describe the customary charges accumu-
lated for a physician and the prevailing charges established in a locality.
32. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 70-36, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director. Bureau of
Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (Dec. 1970).
33. Id
Subsequent screens became effective on July Ist of each year and were based upon
charges for services rendered during the previous calendar year. 20 C.F.R. § 405.504(a)(2)
(1971).
34. The wage and price controls imposed by the Nixon administration in 1971 put a
limitation on the percentage by which physicians' charges could be increased. The controls
were in effect during the periods from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972; July I, 1972 to August 12,
1973; and, August 13, 1973 through June 30, 1974. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 71-16, from
Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and
Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (Sept. 1971); Part B Intermediary Letter No. 72-6, from Thomas
M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education. and Welfare,
to all Part B Carriers (Sept. 1972); Part B Intermediary Letter No. 73-14, from Thomas M.
Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all
Part B Carriers (Aug. 1973).
35. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act - Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled.
Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 224, 49 Stat. 620 (1972), instructed carriers to
use the economic index. This was not implemented until July of 1975.
36. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 72-31, at 53, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director,
Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers
(Dec. 1972).
b. Economic index.-The initial instructions for implementa-
tion of the economic index provided that "prevailing charge levels
used in determining Medicare reasonable charges for physicians'
services. . .[could] be increased above the level for FY (fiscal year)
1973 only to the extent determined to be justified by the Secretary on
the basis of appropriate economic index data. 37 The system was
designed to assure that prevailing charges would be increased, in the
aggregate, only to the extent justified by changes in physicians' earn-
ings levels and in the costs of the practice of medicine.38
The economic index created administrative complications in the
establishment of allowable charges, 39 but offered little control of
physicians' fees. Since the prevailing charges continued to be calcu-
lated from the physicians' customary charges,4" the base figure to
which the index was ultimately applied remained under the direct
control of the physician and could be increased at will. This factor,
coupled with the increase in the economic index from 17.9 4 to 42.6
in three years,42 meant that allowable charges for physicians' services
continued to rise at a steady pace. Although the use of the index
would slow the rate at which physicians' charges rose, the inherent
37. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 75-17, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of
Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (June 1975).
38. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 72-31, at 53, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director,
Bureau of Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers
(Dec. 1972).
This system retained the basic reasonable charge concept-that Medicare payment is
based upon the lowest of a physicians' customary charge, the prevailing charge, or the actual
charge listed on the claim. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra
39. The instructions for applying the economic index illustrate the complexity of that
endeavor.
The cumulative economic index must be applied to individual prevailing charges in each
locality. Carriers should, therefore, calculate prevailing charges for physicians' serv-
ices for FY 1976 in accord with the established reasonable charge methodology.
Each item in these screens should then be compared to the corresponding item in a
list of the maximum prevailing charges that could be allowed for FY 1976. This list
should be developed by multiplying each prevailing charge screen for FY 1973 by
1.179 (i.e., the cumulative economic index for FY 1976). For example, since the cu-
mulative economic index figure for FY 1976 is 1.179, if the FY 1973 prevailing
charge for a particular service in a locality were $100, then the maximum prevailing
charge that could be allowed for that service during FY 1976 would be $117.90.
The prevailing charge to be allowed for any given physician service during FY 1976
will then be the lower of (1) the maximum prevailing charge that could be allowed
under the cumulative economic index provision (as described above); or (2) the pre-
vailing charge that was calculated in accord with the established reasonable charge
methodology (i.e., the 75th percentile (weighted by frequency) of the customary
charges for the service) based on CY [calender year] 1974 charge data.
Part B Intermediary Letter No. 75-17, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health
Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (June 1975).
40. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
41. Part B Intermediary Letter No. 75-17, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of
Health Insurance, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (June 1975).
42. The July 1978 index was established at 1.426. Therefore, the prevailing charges for
physicians' services used during the twelve month period beginning July 1, 1978, could not
exceed by more than 42.6% of the prevailing charges in effect on June 30, 1973. 43 Fed. Reg.
28,559 (1978).
weakness of permitting the physicians to establish the base figure ne-
gated any possibility of truly effective cost containment.
The reasonable charge concept was adopted to fulfill the legisla-
tive intent that reimbursements to the elderly keep pace with the in-
creases in physicians' fees.4 3 For this purpose, the reasonable charge
system may have been adequate." The system, however, simply did
not operate as an effective cost container.
2. Early Congressional Recognition of the Shortcomings of the
Reasonable Charge Method of Payment.--On January 2, 1968, Con-
gress enacted a statute45 permitting the Secretary to engage in experi-
ments and demonstration projects designed to provide incentives for
economy in the health care area. Emphasizing that the quality of
health care was not to be sacrificed for economy,46 the statute specifi-
cally directed the Secretary to investigate whether the methods of
payment of charges for health care services eligible for coverage
under the Social Security Act 47 were as efficient as possible.
48
The experiments were to be conducted either directly by the
Secretary or through grants to other public or private agencies.49
The Secretary was specifically entitled to circumvent the reasonable
charge provisions of Title XVIII while performing the experiment.50
This provision, however, was not intended to signal a total disregard
of the reasonable charge concept. 5' Even before this statute was in-
corporated into the Medicare Program,52 however, the Secretary be-
gan to promulgate regulations that diverged from the reasonable
charge system of reimbursement 53 as established by the original
43. See Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3d Cir. 1974).
44. Contra, Health Insurancefor Older People, Filling the Gaps in Medicare, CONSUMER
REPORTS, January 1976 at 27-34. From the inception of Medicare to 1976, out of pocket medi-
cal expenses for people over 65 doubled. In 1976, the average medical bill for a Medicare
patient was $1218.00. Of that amount, Medicare paid $463.00. In 1974, Medicare paid only
62% of participants' hospital bills and only 52% of doctor bills eligible for payment under the
Medicare Program. Id at 27.
45. Act of January 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 402(a), (b), 81 Stat. 930, 931 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395b-! (1976)).
46. This objective is evidenced in the title of the statute---'Incentives for economy while
maintaining or improving quality in provision of health care services." Id
47. Experimentation was authorized in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395b, 1395c-1395i, 1395i-2,
1395j-1395w, 1395x-1395dd, 1395ff-1395pp, 1396-1396d, 1396f-1396i, 701-715 (1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-l(a) (1976).
49. Id
50. Id. § 1395b-l(b) (1976).
5 i. The statute required that any deviation from the reasonable charge system be limited
to those items or services designated as part of a specific experiment. Id
52. The explanatory note to 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1 reveals that "this section was not en-
acted as part of the Social Security Act," and the provision was not specifically incorporated
into the Medicare Program until the passage of the Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
603, § 201, 49 Stat. 620 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1970)).
53. The Secretary began to utilize relative value scales as an initial movement away from
the reasonable charge concept. See notes 55-84 and accompanying text infra. Later the lowest
charge level concept was utilized. See Part IIC infra.
Medicare Act and reiterated in the only major revision of the Act.5 4
B. Relative Value Guides-The De-emphasis of the Reasonable
Charge System of Payment
Shortly after the inception of Medicare, the Secretary began to
place emphasis on the use of relative value guides5  to supplement
the establishment of reasonable charges. 56 The guides were imple-
mented because there were some services for which carriers would
be unable to accumulate sufficient cost data to accurately establish
reasonable charges. Therefore, carriers were advised that relative
value guides could be used by the carrier to fill gaps in customary
and prevailing charge screens. 7
While the initial implementation of a payment base using this
system was complex,58 the method has been fairly effective in con-
trolling the level of physician reimbursement.5 ' The use of the
guides, however, does present potential problems in light of several
recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent decrees.6"
1. Implementation Difculties.
a. In General.-The Medicare Act6 did not provide for the
use of a relative value guide. Shortly thereafter, however, instruc-
tions were issued that provided for the use of relative value guides
under limited circumstances.62
The directive emphasized that relative value scales were not to
be used as substitutes for the establishment of reasonable charge
54. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
(Medicare). Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 49 Stat. 620 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395-1396 (1970)).
55. See note 12 supra.
56. See notes 20-33 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the establishment of
reasonable charges.
57.
Where there is no reliable statistical basis for determining the customary charge of a
physician or other person for a particular medical procedure or service, the carrier
may develop or use an existing relative value scale. The relative value scale should
be used to determine an estimated customary charge for the particular procedure or
service in relation to the customary charges of the same physician or other person for
other services. Similarly, where there is no reliable statistical basis for determining a
prevailing charge for a medical procedure or service in the locality, a relative value
scale may be used to determine an estimated prevailing charge for a procedure or
service in relation to prevailing charges for other services in the same locality.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, PART B MANUAL REVISION No. 94 § 6707 (July 1968).
58. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra.
59. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text infra.
60. See notes 86-100 and accompanying text infra for discussion.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1973).
62. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, PART B INTERMEDIARY MANUAL REVISION No. 94 (July 1968). The manual
provides the practical operating instructions needed by the carriers responsible for administra-
tion of Part B of Medicare.
screens and use of the scales was to be limited to those situations in
which the carrier did not have sufficient charge information or to
infrequently performed services.6 3 Further, Medicare carriers were
encouraged to develop their own relative value guides rather than
adopt guides prepared by medical specialty groups or by medical
societies.' Thus, the guides would reflect charging practices in the
carrier's service area and constrict the carrier's payment parame-
ters65 to the reasonable charge concept whenever possible.66
The use of relative value guides was expanded by the Secretary
in December of 1975.67 After emphasizing that carriers should de-
velop their own guides, the Secretary promulgated instructions au-
thorizing the use of several prominent relative value guides.68
The first specific directions for the general use of a relative value
guide were issued in April of 1975.69 To ensure that all physicians
would have a customary charge for almost all procedures,70 the Sec-
retary directed establishment of conversion factors 7' for physicians
in all specialties72 according to detailed instructions7 3 issued by the
Department. Prevailing charges were to be established using the
physician's customary charges. Consequently, for all services for
which a customary charge could be calculated a prevailing charge
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Payment parameters are the internal guidelines that carriers establish to expedite
payment of claims.
66.
The carrier has a responsibility for ensuring that a relative value scale which is used
to estimate customary charges or prevailing charges accurately reflects charge pat-
terns in the area serviced by the carrier. Similarly, the conversion factor used with
the relative value scale should reflect the known customary charges of the physician
or other person for whom a customary charge is being estimated, or the known pre-
vailing charges for services in the locality, as appropriate.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, PART B MANUAL REVISION No. 94 (July 1968).
67. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, PART B MANUAL REVISION No. 466 (Aug. 1975).
68. The AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, INC., RELATIVE VALUE GUIDE
(1973), could be used to determine payment to anesthesiologists according to regulations set
out in SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, PART B INTERMEDIARY MANUAL REVISION No. 466 (Aug. 1975). In Pennsylvania,
permissible charges for plastic surgery were denoted by ROBERT H. IVY SOCIETY, ROBERT H.
IvY SOCIETY RELATIVE VALUE SCALE FOR PLASTIC SURGERY (3d rev. ed. 1971).
69. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, PART B INTERMEDIARY MANUAL REVISION No. 565 (April 1977).
70. A physician may lack a conversion factor for a particular service-e.g surgery or
radiology-because customary conversion factors may only be calculated if the physician has
at least seven customary charges for services in that category. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICARE CARRIER'S MANUAL
§ 5022 (Dec. 1972). See generally note 83 infra.
71. See note 12 supra.
72. HEW has established forty-four categories (e.g., oral surgery, family practice, derma-
tology) from which a physician may select his specialty. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MEDICARE CARRIER'S MANUAL § 13215
(Dec. 1972).
73. See, id § 5022-5024.
could be computed.74
b. The Pennsylvania experience.-The complexity of this direc-
tive is illustrated by the experience of the Pennsylvania Medicare
carrier. 75 At the time of the issuance of the Manual Revision, Penn-
sylvania Blue Shield had been processing Medicare claims based
upon customary and prevailing charges established solely from ac-
tual charge data. When the carrier received a claim for which it had
no computed customary or prevailing charges on which to base pay-
ment, the claim was referred to a medical advisor and paid accord-
ing to the advisor's recommendation.76 Thus, since relative value
guides had not been extensively used by Pennsylvania Blue Shield,
the implementation of Manual Revision 565 required that the carrier
compute a conversion factor for every physician.77
2. Evaluation.-While no statistical information is available
on the effectiveness of the relative value scale as a cost containment
provision, this method reduced allowable payment figures in several
areas. This results from two factors. First, each medical specialty
78
involves numerous medical procedures, some more costly than
others.79 Less expensive procedures are performed more frequently
than the complex procedures.8" Therefore, the process of averaging
all charges performed by one specialty to arrive at a conversion fac-
tor results in a lower calculation. Lower conversion factors in turn
result in lower allowable charges for physicians' services.
74. Id § 5022.
75. Pennsylvania Blue Shield is the Part B Medicare carrier for the entire state of Penn-
sylvania for persons whose coverage originates under the Social Security Administration. The
Travelers Insurance Company administers the Medicare Program for those individuals whose
coverage is under the auspices of the Railroad Retirement Board. References made in this
comment to the Pennsylvania carrier are to Pennsylvania Blue Shield unless otherwise speci-
fied.
76. In these situations carriers are instructed to
[clonsult with any medical authority that you would consider helpful, such as the
medical personnel on your staff, the local or State medical society, or hospital medi-
cal personnel. In assessing the value of the procedure, the medical personnel should
take into consideration: (a) its complexity; (b) the surgical skill required; (c) the time
needed to perform the procedure; and (d) the prevailing charges in the locality for
other procedures of comparable complexity.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
MEDICARE CARRIER'S MANUAL § 5205 (Dec. 1972).
77. Pennsylvania Blue Shield had previously determined conversion factors for only two
specialties-anesthesiologists and plastic surgeons. See note 68 supra.
78. See note 72 supra.
79. For example, Pennsylvania Blue Shield has a physician specialty designated orthope-
dic surgeon. Included in the types of services an orthopedic surgeon renders are an ar-
throcentesis (an injection into a joint) and a hip arthroplasty (formation of moveable joint).
The prevailing charge in one locality for the arthrocentesis is $15.00, while the prevailing
charge for the hip arthroplasty is $1500.00. This information is based upon the charge data
(1975 charges) utilized by Pennsylvania Blue Shield to establish charge screens effective from
September 26, 1976, through June 30, 1977.
80. While 2,169 arthrocenteses were reported in one locality during the period from Jan-
uary I, 1975, through December 30, 1975, only twenty-five hip arthroplasties were reported.
Second, prior to the extensive use of relative value guides,
charges were reviewed by medical personnel on the carrier's staff
when charge screens listed no reasonable charge information for a
service.8 Since the medical consultants followed current charging
practices the approved charges were inflationary. By contrast, the
Medicare calculated customary and prevailing charge screens are
based upon charge data six to eighteen months behind the current
charging practices.82 Therefore, the fees recommended by the medi-
cal consultants were normally higher than allowances made on the
basis of calculated charge screens.
As a result of implementation of the relative value guide con-
cept of payment few physicians lack calculated customary charges
for the services that they perform.83 Thus, there are also few types of
services without sufficient charge data to establish a prevailing
charge.84 The system, therefore, ensures that only those truly rare
procedures will receive individual consideration and be paid upon
the advice of medical consultants. Consequently, the use of the rela-
tive value guide concept eliminates the inflationary effect of permit-
ting consultants to recommend payment based upon current
charging practices and establishes a system that creates low conver-
sion factors that lower the overall allowable payments.
3. Conflict with recent FTC rulings.-Despite initial implemen-
tation problems, the relative value guide concept of payment appears
to be a viable basis of payment for physicians' services under a NHI
plan. The idea offers an effective method of cost containment, at
least when compared to a reasonable charge payment program. Fur-
thermore, physicians are familiar with the system and are, therefore,
81. See note 76 supra.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(E) (1976). New charge screens are implemented on July
I of each year and are based upon charges submitted during the previous calendar year. Thus,
the July 1, 1978, charge screen is based upon charges submitted during 1977, rendering the
charge screen at least six months behind a physician's charging practice and possibly eighteen
months behind.
83. A physician must have performed a service a minimum of seven times before a cus-
tomary charge may be established from that data. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL § 5010.1
(Dec. 1972). There were physicians who had not performed a particular type service with the
requisite frequency to calculate a conversion factor. In reality, these physicians lacked conver-
sion factors, not because they did not perform the type service often enough but rather because
they simply never performed the type service in question. The services which the physician
routinely performed as a part of his specialty would be done with sufficient frequency to insure
that he would have a conversion factor for all services in the type service in which he special-
ized. For example, a surgeon would have performed a sufficient number of surgical proce-
dures to establish the requisite customary charges. This would enable the carrier to calculate a
surgical conversion factor to be used to compute a customary charge for those rare surgical
procedures that the physician has not performed with sufficient frequency to establish a cus-
tomary charge.
84. Since prevailing charges are derived from customary charges it is possible for a truly
rare procedure to lack a prevailing conversion factor.
more likely to accept the control willingly. The Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), however, suspects relative value guides to be possible
violations of antitrust law.85
In early 1976 witnesses before House and Senate subcommittees
considering Medicare amendments, condemned the inconsistencies
between policies being instituted under Medicare and recent FTC
antitrust actions involving the use of relative value guides.86 "[T]he
Department of Justice and the FTC [were] initiating antitrust actions
against the use of relative value scales, calling them 'price fixing'
while the Department of Health, Education and Welfare [was] en-
couraging their use through HEW reimbursement plans."87 Concern
over these inconsistencies led to the suggestion that an antitrust ex-
emption be proposed for the relative value scale,88but to date no ac-
tion has been taken on this proposal.8 9
The FTC, however, did not wait for congressional action. On
December 14, 1976, the Commissioners unanimously9° accepted
consent decrees that required the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists9 and the American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons9 2 to, among other things, cease "publishing, promulgating
and participating in the development of relative scales which have
the effect of establishing prices for medical and surgical services."93
A similar consent agreement was subsequently accepted by the FTC
barring the relative value guide utilized by the American College of
Radiology.94
The Commission condemned the guides even though a physi-
cian may assign his own conversion factor to the formula,9 5 because
85. The FTC has recently examined the possibility that relative value guides are a form
of price fixing and thus, unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,171. This comment uses the term
"antitrust laws" loosely to include the FTCA although the FTCA is, technically, not an anti-
trust law. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
86. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 6 (Sept. 28, 1976). The FTC defines a relative value scale
as a list of "comparative numerical values for surgical and medical procedures and services.
The values are usually stated in nonmonetary units, but they can be converted to a fee sched-
ule by applying a dollar conversion factor to them." 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,171.
87. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 6 (Sept. 28, 1976).
88. The proposed exemption reads:
It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust laws for any person or representative
group of physicians to create, publish or revise any code, index, standard terminology
or relative value-scale for particular medical services if such code, index, standard
terminology or relative value scale reasonably relates the comparative difficulty, risk
and the degree of skill required in rendering such medical services.
S. 3205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
89. The proposal is still under consideration by the Senate Finance Committee. It has
been renumbered S. 2932.
90. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,171.
91. 42 Fed. Reg. 4119 (1977).
92. Id. at 4118.
93. Id The wording of the consent agreements is identical.
94. Id. at 20,287.
95. A physician may not assign his own conversion factor to the relative value guide for
the adherence to a relative value guide "freezes" the relationship
among fees for different procedures.9 6 Consequently, once a proce-
dure is establishedal 90 units, it is always three times as costly as a
procedure valued at 30 units.97 The FTC further objected to the use
of such scales because price fixing could be accomplished by a mere
agreement among physicians to use a uniform conversion factor.98
Although the relative value system designed for use under the
Medicare Program is substantially identical to those subject to the
FTC's consent decrees, the former is still in use.99 Since the conver-
sion factors used under the Medicare Program are established by the
carrier and not by the physician,' 00 the fear that physicians will ban
together and use the same conversion factor is lessened. Thus it is
possible that the FTC would approve the use of a relative value
guide if the NHI proposal utilized a system similar to the Medicare
format.
The basic problem with the system, however, is that the propor-
tional value relationship among the services remains constant.
Therefore, Congress should not incorporate a method of payment
under NHI until it either determines that the concept will not con-
flict with the FTC's views on price fixing or enacts a special exemp-
tion from antitrust liability for NHI programs.
The Medicare Program has, however, provided NHI proponents
with alternatives to the use of reasonable charge and relative value
guide concepts. Developments in other areas of claims payment
such as chronic renal disease treatment' and, more recently, dura-
use under Medicare. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of how
conversion factors are established for Medicare purposes.
96. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21.171.
97. Id See note 12 supra for an explanation of units and a general discussion of the
relative value guide concept.
98. Id This complaint is not pertinent to the use of relative value scales in the Medicare
program. Under Medicare a conversion factor is computed for physicians. They do not have
the liberty to designate their own conversion factor. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text
supra.
99. HEW instructed carriers to cease using the three scales specifically banned by the
FTC. The Department did not instruct carriers to discontinue use of the relative value guides
developed by them for specific use in the Medicare program, nor did it acknowledge that the
Medicare relative value system is substantially identical to those condemned by the FTC. Part
B Intermediary Letter No. 77-6, at 1, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health
Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (Jan. 1977).
100. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text supra.
101. The Medicare Program provides coverage for end stage renal disease patients but
reference to this condition in the Medicare Carriers Manual is to chronic renal disease. The
MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL HIM 14-3 § 2230.1 defines the condition and explains the ter-
minology differences, as follows:
Chronic Renal Disease (CRD).-Terminology - The term 'end-stage renal disease' is
the technically accurate term for that stage of chronic renal disease which requires a
continuing course of dialysis or kidney transplantation to ameliorate uremic symp-
toms and maintain life. The term 'chronic renal disease' alone does not describe this
stage of renal disease completely because many chronic renal conditions do not re-
quire maintenance dialysis or kidney transplant; however, the term end-stage may
connote a terminal condition to patients not familiar with this language. The term
ble medical equipment and laboratory services, indicate a trend to-
ward the "lowest charge level" concept, t°2 a method of paymentmore amenable to cost control. 103
C. "'Lowest Charge Level"
The "lowest charge level" concept is the most recent congres-
sional effort to establish an effective method for reimbursement of
physicians' charges. This system uses a double tier approach to es-
tablish allowable charges. First, the reasonable charge concept is
used to determine the allowable charge. Second, the charge estab-
lished in step one is compared to the lowest charge at which the serv-
ice is available. The lower of the two charges is paid.
The "lowest charge level" was officially implemented with the
payment of laboratory charges and durable medical equipment."°
The format was initially utilized in Medicare, however, with the pay-
ment of services rendered to patients suffering from chronic renal
disease. 'o5
1. Chronic Renal Disease.-In 1972 the Medicare Program was
expanded to encompass disabled persons. 10 6 As part of this ex-
panded coverage, the previously state operated renal disease pro-
grams were eliminated, 0 7and all chronic renal disease patients came
chronic renal disease (CRD) is therefore used in this manual with the understanding
that in this context the reference is to chronic renal disease which requires hemodial-
ysis or transplantation, as set out in the law. In correspondence with the public, it is
recommended that a term such as 'permanent kidney failure' be used, or 'chronic
renal disease,' with the qualifying language of the law.
Id.
102. See Part IIC infra.
103. See notes 142-46 and accompanying text infra.
104. See notes 126-29 and accompanying text infra.
105. Congress did not officially establish the lowest charge level concept of payment for
use in the payment of chronic renal disease services, but the Secretary adopted a payment
program that was substantially identical to the lowest charge level concept. See notes 115-20
and accompanying text infra.
106. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled.
Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 201, 49 Stat. 620. The purpose of § 201 was
to extend Medicare benefits to people who are severely disabled. This group, which
has limited income, has been unable to purchase adequate private insurance. The
disabled also use medical and hospital services to a greater degree than the nondis-
abled population. Because of greater usage and, therefore, greater cost, Congress has
refrained from passing legislation covering this group. This year they decided that
the need was greater than the cost. As a cost-cutting device, they included the 24-
month 'waiting period.' This insures that only the most severely disabled will be cov-
ered.
Part B Intermediary Letter No. 72-31, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health
Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carriers (Dec. 1972).
107. See Mid Atlantic Nephrology Center, Ltd. v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D. Md.
1977). This case outlines a typical transition from a state controlled renal disease program to
the payment program after Medicare began to cover these patients.
Prior to federal coverage, Maryland paid 100% of the certified cost of dialysis treatment of
eligible Maryland citizens not covered by other insurance. Since July 1, 1973, the state and
federal government working together pay 100% of the costs. Maryland pays 100% during the
under the auspices of Medicare.'08
The expense associated with treatment of renal disease is cata-
strophic,10 9 and coverage in this area has traditionally been much
broader than that in other areas of the Medicare program. I t° The
new legislation required Medicare carriers to establish a method of
payment for maintenance dialysis services"' in a health care plan
that had previously excluded maintenance care." 12 Thus, a major
experiment involving the use of a method of payment based upon a
system other than reasonable charge data'' 3 was initiated.
Originally, physicians were instructed to bill for maintenance
dialysis treatment on the same basis as they had billed for services to
the aged-documenting the medical necessity for services rendered
and expecting that such charges would check against reasonable
charge screens. 114 In June 1974 instructions were issued that gave
physicians the option of continuing to bill on the basis of the original
instructions or electing an alternative reimbursement method.' '
The alternative method provided a fixed monthly payment and
would reflect physician variations in charges. 16 The significance of
the alternative method was that it paid physicians on a pre-set "fee
first three months of care and 20% of the cost of treatment thereafter. The Federal End Stage
Renal Disease Program pays 80% of the cost of treatment after the first three months.
108. See Part B Intermediary Letter No. 72-31, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bu-
reau of Health Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carri-
ers (Dec. 1972).
109. Mid Atlantic Nephrology Center, Ltd. v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D. Md. 1977).
The court stated that the cost of a dialysis treatment has risen dramatically throughout the
country since the inception of the federal program and acknowledged that the cost may now be
about $25,000 a year per patient. Id
110. For example, a water softening system is not covered under the Medicare Program
except for use with a hemodialysis unit. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL, Coverage issues ch.
11 app. (Mar. 1979). Appendix to Chapter 11, Item 25.2.
Ill. Maintenance dialysis is
the usual periodic dialysis treatments which are given to a patient who has chronic
renal disease in order to sustain life and ameliorate uremic symptoms. Maintenance
hemodialysis is generally required two to three times per week and peritoneal dialysis
once per week, but less frequent treatments are sometimes adequate. In addition,
greater frequency may be covered upon review of evidence which establishes medical
necessity.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL § 2230.1 (Dec. 1975).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(a)(l) (1976).
113. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Part B Intermediary Letter No. 73-22, at 8, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director,
Bureau of Health Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B
Carriers (July 1973).
115. See Part B Intermediary Letter No. 74-20, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bu-
reau of Health Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carri-
ers (June 1974). The option is limited in one respect. The physician can elect the alternative
method of billing only when all of the physicians in a facility who render services to a patient
on maintenance dialysis elect to do so. 1d
116. Variations in charges include not only frequency of services but also complexity. Id
at 2.
per patient" basis. 17
Renal surgical payments were based upon the reasonable
charge calculated upon actual charge data when the data was avail-
able.'" When insufficient data was available to establish customary
and prevailing charges, payment for renal surgeries was to be based
upon the use of a relative value scale." 9 The payment guidelines,
however, extended beyond traditional Medicare parameters and pro-
vided that regardless of which method was utilized to calculate the
reasonable charge for a surgical operation, in no case could the rea-
sonable charge exceed maximum dollar amounts. 
20
Minor alterations have been made to this method of payment'
2'
but essentially, after the system reached a fixed fee basis, it has not
been substantially changed. Thus, in the area of chronic renal dis-
ease, the Medicare program has implemented, with congressional
approval,' 22 a method of payment based upon relatively innovative
systems-"fee per patient" for medical care and, virtually, a fixed fee
program for surgical services.
The success of the system is qualified because it deals with a
unique situation. The treatment of chronic renal disease is an expen-
sive long term effort,' 23 and physician and patient acceptance of a
117. Since the payment of physicians services is based upon an elective method, it is possi-
ble for a physician to continue to receive payment on a "fee per service" basis for maintenance
care (ile., the physician could charge for maintenance dialysis care per service rendered rather
than receiving a lump sum payment). The instructions, however, also provide that payment
for the initial period during which a patient is trained on the dialysis unit will be made to the
physician on the basis of a comprehensive training payment-ie., a lump sum. No option is
available and thus "fee per patient" is the only method of payment in this area. Id. at 1.
118. See Part B Intermediary Letter No. 73-23, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bu-




While the format for payment of chronic renal disease claims and the lowest charge level
are the same, the concepts differ in the manner by which the maximum allowable charge is
established. See notes 128-38 and accompanying text infra.
121. E.g., Part B Intermediary Letter No. 75-10, from Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bu-
reau of Health Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to all Part B Carri-
ers (Mar. 1975) (provided adjustments in the maximum allowances for surgical procedures);
Part B Intermediary Letter No. 78-29, from Mildred L. Tysowski, Acting Director, Medicare
Bureau, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (July 1978) (provided adjustments in
the alternative monthly allowance). The payment methods described in notes 115-20 supra
were incorporated into the Federal Regulations effective January I, 1978. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.541-.544 (1978).
122. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
(Medicare). Act of June 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-292. The Act incorporated into the statute a
clarification of the Secretary's authority to provide reimbursement for physicians' services in
connection with routine maintenance dialysis in accordance with reimbursement methods dis-
cussed in notes 115-20 and accompanying text rupra. The purpose of these regulations is, in
part, to encourage more extensive use of lower cost treatment methods and reduce Medicare
expenditures. See 43 Fed. Reg. 37,721 (1978).
123. See Dialy sis, PROSPECTIVE (Summer 1978) (comprehensive discussion of the costs
associated with the chronic renal disease program). When Pub. L. No. 92-603 was under con-
sideration, costs for the End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program were predicted to be $100
million, rising to $250 million by 1976. When the program became effective in July 1973 the
method of payment in this situation may not be successful when ap-
plied to the general public via a national health insurance plan.
Recent instructions from the Secretary have, however, ex-
panded the fixed fee concept into the areas of durable medical
equipment and laboratory services. 124 The reaction to these pro-
grams may provide added insight into the viability of a "lowest
charge level" program of payment. 1
25
2. Durable Medical Equipment and Laboratory Services.-
Originally, the reasonable charge provisions were to provide a pay-
ment base not only for physicians services, 26 but also for durable
medical equipment and laboratory services.' 27 In 1972, however,
Congress altered the format of the reasonable charge calculations by
providing that
[i]n the case of medical services, supplies, and equipment (includ-
ing equipment servicing) that, in the judgment of the Secretary, do
not generally vary significantly in quality from one supplier to an-
other, the charges incurred after December 31, 1972, determined
to be reasonable may not exceed the lowest charge levels at which
such services, supplies, and equipment are widely and consistently
available in a locality except to the extent and under the circum-
stances specified by the Secretary.' 
28
This provision necessitated the establishment of rules for determin-
ing the lowest charge levels at which such items were available.
29
These rules are discussed briefly in the following section, since
they provide the most efficient cost control mechanism implemented
in the Medicare program to date. This mechanism, with slight varia-
tion, would be highly efficient for use as a cost containment provi-
sion under a national health insurance plan.
3
1
a. General instructions for the designation andpayment of items
at the lowest charge level.-Under the "lowest charge level" rules the
Secretary will periodically select items and services that he feels
could be more efficiently reimbursed at the lowest charge level avail-
able throughout a designated area, as opposed to payment upon the
cost for the first year was listed at $250 million and was predicted to be almost $1 billion
annually by 1978. This figure was based upon a treatment cost of $20,000 per patient per year.
Id at 27. By 1977, however, figures reflect a per patient cost of $24,300 per year. Id at 27.
124. See notes 128-41 and accompanying text infra.
125. For discussion see notes 142-46 and accompanying text infra.
126. See notes 28-44 and accompanying text supra.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(A) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)(C) (1976) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(s)(6) (1976) provide that the term service means, in part, diagnostic services and dura-
ble medical equipment used in the patient's home.
128. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
(Medicare). Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395u(b)(3)(E) (1976).
129. See 43 Fed. Reg. 32295 (1978) and notes 131-38 and accompanying text infra.
130. See notes 143-46 and accompanying text infra.
standard reasonable charge system.' 3 ' Prior to further action, the
Secretary must publish notice in the Federal Register that the item
has been so designated and must invite the public to comment,
within a designated time frame, on his decision.'32
If after receipt and analysis of the public comments133 the Secre-
tary concludes that the lowest charge level is the appropriate course
of action, Medicare carriers are instructed to establish the maximum
charge at which reimbursement will be made. These charges will be
calculated in January and July of each year and are to be set at the
twenty-fifth percentile of charges (incurred or submitted on claims
processed by the carrier) for that item or service in the locality desig-
nated by the carrier for this payment method. 
13
The system, therefore, provides a fourth check under the stan-
dard three part reasonable charge concept. Along with the existing
customary charge, prevailing charge, and the charge at which the
carrier offers these items and services to its own policyholders and
subscribers,' 35 the "lowest charge level" 136 is a new maximum charge
added to the check list.
Since the carrier's selection of the area to be used in the compu-
tation of the lowest charge level will affect the result, specific instruc-
tions for establishing which "locality" is to be used have also been
incorporated into the regulations. "31 Subject to the approval of the
Secretary, the carrier may consider "locality" for the purpose of this
regulation to be its entire service area or any geographic area that
the carrier assesses as best suited for efficient compliance with these
regulations. 138
b. Implementation of the lowest charge level method.-The Sec-
retary has designated certain items of durable medical equipment
39
and certain commonly performed laboratory services 140 as the test
13 I. For an explanation of the reasonable charge concept see notes 28-40 supra.
132. 43 Fed. Reg. 32295 (1978).
133. Id
134. Payment at the twenty-fifth percentile means that the charges submitted for the serv-
ices in question are listed in order of amount, beginning with the lowest. The lowest charge
level will then be set at the dollar amount that covered 25% of the charges. Id See also notes
25-30 and accompanying text supra (prevailing fee is established at the seventy-fifth percen-
tile).
135. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 32301 (1978).
137. 43 Fed. Reg. 32300 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 405.511(d)). The Secretary
has indicated that these localities need not be the same as those utilized for the purposes of
calculating the prevailing fee.
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 32300 (1978).
139. Standard wheelchairs and standard hospital beds, and attachments thereto, were the
first items of durable medical equipment specified for use with the lowest charge level reim-
bursement plan. 43 Fed. Reg. 32335 (1978).
140. Twelve laboratory tests (cholesterol, complete blood count, hemoglobin, hematocrit,
prothrombin time, sedimentation rate, blood sugar, cytologic study, urinalysis, blood uric acid,
items for the lowest charge level concept, Since the new fee screens
could not be implemented immediately on all items, those items of
consistent quality and frequent use were selected as the first step in
implementing the regulations. 141
3. Ultimate Effect of the Lowest Charge Level Payment Plan.-
It is too soon to determine the effects of these regulations on the basis
of actual data, but the "lowest charge" concept theoretically provides
the best alternative for payment of medical costs since it has the
maximum cut off point found in a fixed fee program 42 without re-
quiring payment at that amount. 143 By combining the reasonable
charge and fixed fee concept, the "lowest charge level" will select the
lowest of the customary, prevailing, lowest charge, or the amount the
carrier would have applied to its own policyholders. The reasonable
charge concept lacks the maximum cost limit found in the lowest
charge level concept'" while the fixed fee method of payment lacks
the flexibility of paying less than the scheduled amount. "-I In addi-
tion to these functional advantages, the "lowest charge concept" has
received the legislative support that has not been clearly manifested
for the use of a system utilizing a relative value guide. 146 Finally,
there is some judicial authority revealing support for the lowest
charge level payment concept.
14 7
4. Judicial Review of a Comparable Plan.-If a physician, or
his patient, is dissatisfied with a Medicare payment, a fair hearing is
available when the amount in controversy is $100 or greater.
48
Since there is no judicial appeal from the hearing officer's deci-
sion, 149 however, judicial opinion on the payment formats used
blood urea, and leukocyte count) were listed by the Secretary for payment on the basis of
lowest charge level. Id
141. Id Medical equipment and laboratory services are also items that can be subjected to
cost controls with far less repercussion than physician's services. The lowest charge level pay-
ment system is applicable to physicians services and ultimately will also be applied in that
area. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u(b)(3)(E), 1395x(s)(1) (1976).
142. A fixed fee payment plan establishes a standard allowable charge for a medical serv-
ice. Under this format a physician merely lists, on his claim, the service performed and the
insurer pays the fixed amount. The disadvantage of a fixed fee format for cost control is that it
does not permit a physician to charge less than the standard fee.
143. The lowest charge level concept of payment will be a viable method of payment only
if the Secretary sets reasonable maximum allowable charges. If the maximum payment is not
reasonably compatible with the physician's expense incident to the performance of a service,
both the availability and quality of health care will decline.
144. For a discussion of the reasonable charge concept see notes 20-38 and accompanying
text supra.
145. See note 142 supra.
146. See Part lIB.2 supra.
147. See notes 148-76 and accompanying text infra.
148. 42 U.S.C. 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1976).
149. 42 C.F.R. § 405.835 (1977). For discussion of the hearing procedure under both
Medicare Part A and B, see Butler, Medicare Appeals Procedure: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 70
Nw. U. L. REV. 139 (1975).
under the Medicare program can only be assessed by examining
analogous decisions.
In American Medical Association v. Mathews, 150 the court dis-
cussed in detail one concept of cost containment that utilizes a maxi-
mum allowable charge (MAC) 5' as its basis for payment. The
system is functionally equivalent to the "lowest charge level" pay-
ment scheme, and close examination of the decision will reveal the
judicial acceptability of the lowest charge level concept.
a. MACformat.-The procedure established by the Secretary
purports to provide a system whereby the cost of prescription drugs
paid for by the federal programs will be reduced through the appli-
cation of a maximum charge screen. To accomplish this goal the
regulations provide a comprehensive basis for determining which
drugs will be subjected to the maximum charge screens. 152
Under this method the allowable charge for a drug is deter-
mined by comparing it to three charge screens, the MAC, the acqui-
sition and dispensing fee, and the usual charge' 53 for the drug. As in
the "lowest charge level" method under which payment is based
upon the lowest of a four screen test, MAC allows a maximum cut
off charge without confining payment to a fixed fee schedule.
Examination of the MAC program thus reveals that, except for
minor deviations,' 54 it is strikingly similar to the "lowest charge
level" system. Therefore, the elements subject to attack under the
"lowest charge level" concept include those challenged in American
MedicalAssociation v. Mathews. "' In Mathews the American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) attacked the use of the MAC plan in estab-
lishing allowable charges for multi-source drugs under the Medicaid
150. 429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
151. 40 Fed. Reg. 32284 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 19.1-.6).
152. The procedure requires that a board be established to determine the lowest unit price
at which a drug is available. 45 C.F.R. § 19.4(a) (1978). This information is then submitted to
a pharmaceutical reimbursement committee for advice regarding the appropriateness of the
proposal. Id § 19.4(b) After receiving the committee's comments, the board determines
whether to establish the recommendation as a MAC. If so, the decision is published in the
Federal Register with a period for public comment. After receipt and analysis of the com-
ments, the board publishes its final determination. Id. § 19.5.
The MAC calculus also requires that the board regularly review the listing of drugs sub-
ject to MAC, 45 C.F.R. § 19.6 (1978), in the same fashion as the Secretary reviews the lowest
charge level listings. Id See notes 131-34 and accompanying text supra.
153. Usual charge is used in the same context as the prevailing charge for Medicare pur-
poses.
154. For example, a board reviews the multi-source drugs (multi-source drug means a
drug marketed or sold by two or more formulators or labelers or a drug marketed or sold by
the same formulator or labeler under two or more different proprietary names or both under a
proprietary name and without that name, 45 C.F.R. § 19.6 (1978)) to determine whether the
drugs fall within those that should be paid under a MAC formula, while the Secretary
designates items to be paid on a lowest charge level. Also, under the lowest charge level there
is no entity comparable to the pharmaceutical reimbursement committee.
155. 429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. 111. 1977).
program. 5 6 The fundamental issues bearing on the use of this con-
cept in a national health insurance plan included possible inconsis-
tency between MAC and the reimbursement standards of the Social
Security Act, alleged elimination of the patient's free choice of medi-
cal care through MAC, and potential undue influence over the prac-
tice of medicine by the MAC program.
b. Maximum levels of reimbursement do not contravene reim-
bursement standards of the Social Security Act.-The AMA con-
tended that a maximum allowable charge violates the legislative
intent of the cost control provision of Medicare.' The Association
maintained that the MAC provision was intended to be used only in
instances in which institutions were inefficient or when excessive
charging practices occurred.5 8
The court countered this argument first by noting that Congress
had intended its "economizing measure to cover more than merely
the problem of the spendthrift."' 59 Further, the court emphasized
that the legislation could not be viewed in isolation but must be "in-
terpreted in light of a six-year congressional experience with spiral-
ling expenditures under the Medicare Program."' 6 ° The court
pointed out that cost containment in the health field industry was a
major policy of government,' 6 ' and the Secretary had been afforded
full authority to implement such regulations as necessary for the effi-
cient administration of his duties. ' 62 Consequently, the absence of a
specific legislative directive concerning the administration of the
program was "not fatal to the agency's asserted power."'
' 63
c. Patient free choice" in selection of medical care.-The
AMA also contended in the Mathews case that by setting a price
limit on drugs, the Secretary was, in reality, dictating which drug a
patient should purchase."'6 The Association argued that since pa-
tients choose those drugs for which full reimbursement will be made,
setting a MAC on a drug sharply curtails a patient's freedom of
choice.' 65 On this basis, the AMA maintained that the free choice
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1976).
157. Id § 1395u(b)(3)(E).
158. 429 F. Supp. at 1198.
159. Id at 1199.
160. Id
161. The court referred to 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (1976) and acknowledged that,
"When an act expresses such a major policy of government in such general terms, the fact that
the committee reports omit a specific reference to a particular method of agency action to carry
out that policy is not fatal to the agency's asserted power." 429 F. Supp. at 1199.
162. Id at 1200.
163. Id. at 1199.
164. Id at 1200-01.
165. Id. at 1200.
provision of the Medicare Act166was violated.
The court observed that the MAC regulations were designed to
"determine the reasonable costs, not the coverage of drugs ...
They [the MAC levels] only establish upper limits on reimbursement
for certain multi-source drugs."' 167  Therefore the court concluded
that MAC levels were not inconsistent with the statutory "free
choice" guarantee. 
68
d Undue interference with the practice of medicine.-In Ma-
thews the AMA also maintained that the MAC provisions violated
the Medicare Act1 69 because the establishment of a maximum pay-
ment level unduly interfered with the practice of medicine. The As-
sociation contended that the "test of interference . . . is whether the
regulations have the practical effect of controlling judgment in a sig-
nificant number of instances."' 70 Arguably, physicians were forced
to utilize the cheapest drug available or subject patients to higher
Costs. 171
The court's rationale rejecting this argument centered upon the
congressional desire to halt escalating health care costs. The deci-
sion first recognized that in passing legislation that permitted the
Secretary to utilize various methods of payment 7 2 Congress empha-
sized that certain cost containment mechanisms were immune from
the provision against federal interference with the practice of
medicine.173 The court then acknowledged:
By enacting a strengthened cost limitation section . . . and au-
thorizing the Secretary to exercise extensive cost control powers,
166. The AMA raised the free choice provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t), which provides
that any drugs listed in specified drug manuals are eligible for payment under the Medicare
program. The general provision regarding the patient's freedom of choice is found in 42
U.S.C. § 1395a and declares that, "Any individual entitled to insurance benefits under this
title may obtain health services from any institution, agency, or person qualified to participate
under this title if such institution, agency, or person undertakes to provide him such services."
167. 429 F. Supp. at 1201.
168. The premise that a patient's decision is not restricted, and in many cases dictated, by
the amount of coverage his health insurance will provide, is not unique to Mathews. E.g.,
Briarcliff Haven Inc. v. Department of Human Resources of Ga., 403 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (ruling that the establishment of maximum ceilings of reimbursement for amounts paid
to patients confined in skilled nursing facilities did not violate the free choice statute; Medicaid
recipients were assured only that the state would not dictate where they must receive treat-
ment).
169.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee
to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in
which medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of
any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health serv-
ices; or to exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of
any such institution, agency or person.
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976).
170. 429 F. Supp. at 1202.
171. Id
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A) (1976).
173. 429 F. Supp. at 1202.
Congress struck a balance between cost controls and professional
independence. This balance is not upset by the incidental effects
predicted by plaintiffs. The legislative history . . . demonstrates
that Congress wanted the judgmental process in the health care
delivery system to be influenced and animated by a consciousness
of the costs of medical care.
In short, Congress did not intend to shield the medical decision-
making process from financial consequences.' 74
The Mathews decision was qualified, however, by dicta empha-
sizing that the legislation did not require a court to find that all cost
control provisions did not unduly influence the practice of
medicine.' 75 Despite this dicta, it is difficult to conceive of a MAC
plan or a lowest charge level concept of reimbursement violating the
freedom from federal interference provision as interpreted by this
court.
Although no judicial decisions deal directly with the cost con-
tainment provisions used by Medicare, the Mathews case provides,
by analogy, some indication that the lowest charge level concept will
pass judicial muster. Unless a substantial change in the reasoning of
the court occurs, the lowest charge level format of payment should
withstand attack at least as successfully as the reasonable charge and
relative value guide payment concepts.
III. Conclusion
The methods of claim payment that have arisen from thirteen
years of legislative experimentation under Medicare are invaluable
examples for the proponents of NHI. An examination of the evolu-
tionary process from reasonable charge through the "lowest charge
level" highlights the problems that any viable NHI program will
have to surmount. The reasonable charge payment concept illus-
trated that effective controls may not be left to the discretion of the
Secretary or private health insurance carriers who are assigned ad-
ministrative functions. The lowest charge level payment concept,
while not fully tested, does provide the detailed regulation and su-
pervision necessary to provide effective cost control. To date, there-
fore, the "lowest charge level" concept is the most promising method
of cost containment.
The estimated initial cost of NHI ranges between ten billion and
thirty-four billion new tax dollars.' 76 With this price tag, Congress
cannot afford to reconduct the experiments performed by Medicare.
Before passing a national health insurance plan, Congress must take
steps to insure that the best method for payment of physicians' serv-
174. Id
175. 429 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
176. NH!" 5 Options, supra note 7, at 7-18.
ices has been specifically incorporated as an integral part of the plan.
Consequently, the Medicare experience should be examined to help
determine the optimum course to be adopted.
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